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Musto: The Limits and Possibilities of Data-Driven Antitrafficking Effor

THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF
DATA-DRIVEN ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS
Jennifer Musto, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Interest in using technology to respond to human trafficking has
occurred alongside the explosive growth of networked, predictive, and
automated technologies over the last decade. In the United States,
technological innovators have entered the antitrafficking space, a trend
preceded by calls from policymakers, law enforcement agents, and
some nonprofit organization advocates, to examine not only how
technology contributes to human trafficking but also the ways in which
it might be used to combat it.1 In 2012, for instance, President Obama
described the utility of leveraging technology to fight trafficking:
“[W]e’re turning the tables on the traffickers. Just as they are now
using technology and the Internet to exploit their victims, we’re going
to harness technology to stop them.”2
A key idea in antitrafficking discussions is that
technology—particularly “disruptive” data-driven technologies—can
be used to thwart traffickers and at the same time assist people
assumed to be “at risk” of trafficking. More recently, technologies like
algorithms, machine learning, and dark web search tools have been
integrated into countertrafficking efforts.3 For some, these tools are
*

Jennifer Musto is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Wellesley College. She is
an interdisciplinary scholar whose research explores the laws, technologies, and modes of governance
designed to respond to human trafficking and sex work in the United States. Her book, Control and
Protect: Collaboration, Carceral Protection, and Domestic Sex Trafficking in the United States
(University of California Press, 2016), examines state, nonstate, and technology responses to domestic
sex trafficking situations in the U.S. and she has lectured and published widely on these topics.
1. Jennifer Musto, The Posthuman Anti-Trafficking Turn: Technology, Domestic Minor Sex
Trafficking, and Augmented Human-Machine Alliances, in HUMAN TRAFFICKING RECONSIDERED 123,
123–24 (Kimberly Kay Hoang & Rhacel Salazar Parreñas eds., 2014).
2. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-clinton-globalinitiative [https://perma.cc/KXP5-JJQU].
3. See generally Kylie Foy, Artificial Intelligence Shines Light on the Dark Web, MIT NEWS (May
13, 2019), http://news.mit.edu/2019/lincoln-laboratory-artificial-intelligence-helping-investigators-fight-
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seen as critical in identifying traffickers who use technology to exploit
victims and evade law enforcement detection. Yet, assumptions about
technology do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, conversations about what
technology can and cannot do reflect fears, anxieties, aspirations, and
inequalities that exist in society.4
Consider the word “disruption.” When stakeholders in the U.S.
describe a new technology as disruptive, they implicitly suggest that it
has the ability to positively contribute to social change. Optimistic
forecasts suggesting connective technologies would have the capacity
to uproot businesses and politics were commonplace in technology
circles in the mid-to late 2000s, with some commentators going so far
as to suggest that equality, freedom, and human rights are tied to the
development of disruptive technologies.5 In 2020, the idea that
disruptive technologies are uniformly positive seems naive and even
dangerous.
A much-needed public discussion has recently emerged that centers
on the liabilities of digital tools and the biases, discrimination, and
inequalities reproduced through them.6 Yet, less attention has centered
on the ethics and harms surrounding humanitarian efforts, including
data-driven antitrafficking efforts. This is despite the fact that
humanitarian activities like commercial and law enforcement efforts
rely on surveillance techniques developed within a “surveillance
capitalist” system.7 Just as digital tools once framed as advancing
democratic ideals are now viewed by many Americans as authorizing
mass surveillance on an unprecedented scale, so too I would suggest
that data-driven antitrafficking efforts are not as straightforward or as

dark-web-crime-0513 [https://perma.cc/J9VM-TBZ9].
4. DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 15 (2014).
5. Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 75, 85.
6. Dipayan Ghosh, The Commercialization of Decision-Making: Towards a Regulatory Framework
to Address Machine Bias over the Internet, GOVERNANCE EMERGING NEW WORLD, May 6, 2019 at 1, 10,
https://www.hoover.org/research/commercialization-decision-making-towards-regulatory-frameworkaddress-machine-bias-over [https://perma.cc/AHW4-L5SM].
7. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); Mark
TIMES
(July
12,
2019),
Latonero,
Stop
Surveillance
Humanitarianism,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/opinion/data-humanitarian-aid.html
[https://perma.cc/3QRKS4BD].
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helpful as their supporters believe. Instead, those efforts carry risks
that warrant public attention and debate.
Over the course of the past several years, my research has
investigated how and why antitrafficking stakeholders have come to
view technology as so crucial to addressing trafficking—particularly
sex trafficking situations involving youths and adults.8 While it is
evident that the goals of antitrafficking technology initiatives are
well-intentioned, the impact of tech-augmented efforts is mixed at best
and questionable at worst. There are several distinct reasons why
antitrafficking technologies have failed to deliver on their promises.
First, ideas about the benefits of technology are based on a lot of
uninterrogated assumptions rooted in cultural beliefs about progress
and the ability of technology to facilitate it in lieu of wider structural
change.9 Second, discussions about how technologies ought to be used
(and by whom) emerged within a global antitrafficking movement
shaped by enduring political and ideological debates.10 Briefly, some
of these concerns include but are not limited to the following: the
conflation of sex work with sex trafficking and the positioning of
human trafficking as a crime control issue; the circulation of “sketchy”
data to describe the scale and overestimate the scope of human
trafficking; and disparities between the estimated number of victims
and the actual number of victims identified.11 These fissures predate
interest in technology in the antitrafficking space. However, attention
to technology has enhanced the influence of some of the most powerful
8. See, e.g., JENNIFER MUSTO, CONTROL AND PROTECT: COLLABORATION, CARCERAL PROTECTION,
AND DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (2016); Musto, supra note 1; Jennifer Lynne

Musto & danah boyd, The Trafficking-Technology Nexus, 21 SOC. POL. 461, 462 (2014).
9. Musto & boyd, supra note 8.
10. Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1678 (2010).
11. Rita Haverkamp, Victims of Human Trafficking: Considerations from a Crime Prevention
Perspective, in WHAT IS WRONG WITH HUMAN TRAFFICKING? 53, 69 (Ester Herlin-Karnell et al. eds.,
2019); Ella Cockbain & Kate Bowers, Human Trafficking for Sex, Labour and Domestic Servitude: How
Do Key Trafficking Types Compare and What Are Their Predictors?, 72 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 9, 11
(2019); Jo Goodey, Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and Policy Responses, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.
JUST. 421, 437 (2008); Heidi Hoefinger et al., Community-Based Responses to Negative Health Impacts
of Sexual Humanitarian Anti-Trafficking Policies and the Criminalization of Sex Work and Migration in
the US, SOC. SCI., no. 1, 2020, at 1, 2; Carole S. Vance, States of Contradiction: Twelve Ways to Do
Nothing About Trafficking While Pretending to, 78 SOC. RES. 933, 935–36 (2011); Ronald Weitzer, The
Movement to Criminalize Sex Work in the United States, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 61, 66 (2010).
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antitrafficking stakeholders, while lessening the influence of others.12
For instance, state actors like law enforcement agents, along with their
nongovernmental advocate partners, are the ones who determine if “a
person’s involvement in the sex industry is voluntary or coerced and
whether they are entitled to protection, punishment, or some
combination” of those factors.13 Yet, tech actors (i.e., nonhuman
trafficking experts) increasingly wield discretionary power to decide
what qualifies and ultimately counts as sexual exploitation. This
suggests that ideological divisions that already surround
antitrafficking efforts have become more intensified now that human
trafficking is understood as a technological problem that can be
“fixed” with technical solutions.14
Moreover, in an age of surveillance where human and automated
decision-making are increasingly intertwined, at-risk groups endure
heightened surveillance and as a result “become prone to punishment
and criminalization.”15 People seen as vulnerable to trafficking (both
trafficked persons and adults engaged in consensual sex work)
likewise face risks from antitrafficking efforts reliant on carceral
approaches and data-driven responses. 16 As antitrafficking activities
have taken a decidedly sociotechnical turn, sex workers and people at
risk of trafficking must not only contend with laws that still broadly
criminalize sexual labor but must also navigate an antitrafficking
landscape where third-party actors contribute to prevention and
identification efforts that supplement and widely support law
enforcement efforts.17
12. Mitali Thakor & danah boyd, Networked Trafficking: Reflections on Technology and the
Anti-Trafficking Movement, 37 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 277, 286–87 (2013).
13. Hoefinger et al., supra note 11; see also MUSTO, supra note 8, at 28.
14. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 71–72; Musto, supra note 1, at 127–28; Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at
474.
15. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Kathryn Henne & Emily I. Troshynski, Intersectional
Criminologies for the Contemporary Moment: Crucial Questions of Power, Praxis and Technologies of
Control, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 60 (2019).
16. See generally Jennifer Musto, Mitali Thakor & Borislav Gerasimov, Between Hope and Hype:
Critical Evaluations of Technology’s Role in Anti-Trafficking, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April 2020, at 1.
17. MARK LATONERO ET AL., UNIV. S.C. ANNENBERG CTR. ON COMMC’N LEADERSHIP & POLICY,
THE RISE OF MOBILE AND THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED TRAFFICKING 8, 19 (2012);
Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 463; Thakor & boyd, supra note 12.
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Notably, a comprehensive empirical account of antitrafficking
technology initiatives is limited. Indeed, for all of the attention and
resources now focused on integrating technology into
countertrafficking efforts, very little empirical research exists on these
efforts or their overall impact.18 Despite limited social science research
on these developments, it has become increasingly clear that a change
to how scholars, policymakers, and members of the global
antitrafficking community approach the topic of technology is long
overdue.19 For instance, rather than asking if technology is helpful or
harmful—a line of inquiry that circulates in some governmental and
intergovernmental spaces and which can inadvertently frame
technology as neutral and inevitable—I believe it is more productive
to explore some of the presumptive expectations that surround
conversations about technology.20 Unpacking assumptions about
technology is crucial not only in challenging the idea that technology
can solve trafficking but also in highlighting real but widely
unacknowledged risks that accompany the integration of technology in
countertrafficking efforts. The first step towards these ends is to
broaden the focus, for instance by exploring a few animating
questions:

18. DANAH BOYD ET AL., HUMAN TRAFFICKING & TECHNOLOGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN IN THE U.S. 1 (2011), http://www.indiana.edu/~traffick/_resources/_literature/_research/
_assets/Human-Trafficking-and-Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT8A-DNGG]. In an effort to advance
empirical research in this area, I co-edited a special issue on technology and antitrafficking for the journal
Anti-Trafficking Review with Mitali Thakor. See Musto, Thakor & Gerasimov, supra note 16.
19. BOYD ET AL., supra note 18, at 10.
20. Thakor & boyd, supra note 12, at 287. For instance, to commemorate the European Union’s
Anti-Trafficking Day, the Austrian Task Force on Combating Human Trafficking organized a conference
focused on technology that framed the question of technology as a chance or challenge. Technology and
Combating Human Trafficking—Chance or Challenge?, LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INST. HUM. RTS.,
https://bim.lbg.ac.at/en/events/event/2019/10/16/technology-and-combating-human-trafficking-chanceor-challenge [https://perma.cc/R8ZA-3JZ6] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). More recently, there has been an
emphasis on transforming the “liability of technology into an asset.” Using Technology to Combat
Trafficking in Human Beings: OSCE Alliance Against Trafficking Conference Explores How to Turn a
Liability into an Asset, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUROPE (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.osce.org/secretariat/416744 [https://perma.cc/G8G8-HNNY] [hereinafter Using Technology
to Combat Trafficking].
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1. What commonsense ideas shape antitrafficking
technology initiatives?
2. What are the effects of these efforts?
3. What lessons can be learned from past activities in
shaping future efforts?
Exploring these questions offers the chance to complicate
widespread but empirically untested assumptions that circulate in
many antitrafficking circles—for instance, assumptions that suggest
that creating more public–private partnerships and adding automated
technologies to the mix of antitrafficking efforts will invariably
support people at risk of trafficking, especially individuals at risk of
sexual exploitation. In addition to interrogating the dominant
commonsense ethos that surrounds antitrafficking activities, this
Article aims to spark discussion about future antitrafficking prevention
and protection efforts grounded in notions of data ethics and
transparency, as well as principles of accountability, harm reduction,
and racial, gender, sexual, and economic justice.
I. Assumptions and Implications
Many assumptions lie behind antitrafficking technology initiatives
in the U.S. that my and other scholars’ work seeks to unpack.21 Why
focus on assumptions? First, they reveal a great deal about the ways in
which precious resources are allocated and countertrafficking efforts
are focused. Second, assumptions have practical implications and help
to assess how antitrafficking efforts benefit some groups but constrain
others. Third, in order to understand the effects of technology
initiatives and to evaluate whether they are beneficial or risky, it is
important to understand the ideas and values that shape them.
Two interconnected ideas undergird and arguably overshadow all
others in the United States: (1) sex trafficking is a more pressing issue

21. Musto & boyd, supra note 8. For a complementary yet distinctive assessment of the assumptions
and tensions surrounding antitrafficking technology efforts, see Sanja Milivojevic, Heather Moore &
Marie Segrave, Freeing the Modern Slaves, One Click at a Time: Theorising Human Trafficking, Modern
Slavery, and Technology, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April 2020, at 16.
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than labor trafficking; and (2) dominant antiprostitution (i.e.,
neo-abolitionist) approaches are best equipped to address it. U.S.
government policies have overwhelmingly focused attention on sex
trafficking in general and the sexual exploitation of minors in
particular.22 This is despite the fact that scholars note there are likely
more cases of labor trafficking than sex trafficking.23 Such
assumptions are baked into U.S. laws and policies.24 One of the
enduring legacies of the U.S. benchmark antitrafficking legislation, the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 (and its
subsequent reauthorizations), is its sustained focus on sex trafficking
situations involving women and girls, with far less attention on
exploitative labor situations that are nonsexual in nature and involve
migrants.25
Antitrafficking laws also promote an antiprostitution or
“neo-abolitionist” agenda in the U.S. and globally.26 As the legal
scholar Janie Chuang observes, when the U.S. anointed itself as the
“global sheriff” of antitrafficking policy in the 2000s during the
George W. Bush Administration, it used the TVPA and the “economic
sanctions regime” that accompanied it as a “vehicle for the
neo-abolitionists to promote their anti-prostitution agenda
worldwide.”27 Twenty years after the passage of the TVPA and
following the 2018 passage of the Allow States and Victims to Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), the effects of U.S.
antitrafficking laws and attendant countertrafficking efforts have come
into even sharper focus: laws to address human trafficking still
conflate sex work with sex trafficking and still frame trafficking as a
crime control rather than a social justice issue.28 Just as the TVPA
stretched its antitrafficking policy reach beyond U.S. borders, so has

22. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 114; Chuang, supra note 10; Weitzer, supra note 11, at 73.
23. Vance, supra note 11, at 936.
24. Id. at 933.
25. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 37; Vance, supra note 11, at 933, 939.
26. Chuang, supra note 10, at 1679.
27. Id.; Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat
Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 439 (2006).
28. Elizabeth Bernstein, Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The “Traffic in Women” and Neoliberal
Circuits of Crime, Sex, and Rights, 41 THEORY & SOC’Y 233, 253 (2012); Hoefinger et al., supra note 11.
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FOSTA redrawn boundaries too, in this instance by advancing a model
of governance that de facto deputizes internet providers as third-party,
nonstate enforcers of antiprostitution policy, a form of networked
neo-abolition.29
What FOSTA and attendant sociotechnical efforts to address
trafficking reveal is a distinct yet understudied form of governance in
development: an antitrafficking approach and enforcement strategy
that blurs the boundaries between state and nonstate authority.30 Yet,
integrating technology into countertrafficking efforts also muddles the
lines between prevention and protection efforts. In earlier work, I
argued that youth and adults seen as at risk of sex trafficking
sometimes experience a combination of punishment and
protection—what I referred to as “carceral protection.”31 This
arrest-to-assist model of collaborative intervention brings law
enforcement agents together with nonstate actors in new ways that blur
the lines between state and nonstate authority. Yet as the concept quite
literally suggests, the protective part of carceral protectionism is
temporally specific and occurs after state and nonstate authorities
identify people determined to be in exploitative situations, which is to
say after the exploitation occurred.32 What I failed to fully appreciate
until recently is that ideas about risk in general and the production of
the at-risk sex trafficking subjects in particular authorize an array of
activities on the front end too, which is to say on the prevention side.
This is where technology and a form of collaborative, algorithmic
governance comes into play and coheres in discursively producing
at-risk victim–survivor subjects.
For instance, tech-mediated efforts to identify victims and assist
investigators may utilize web scraping, indicator mining, and the
amassment of data in the development of algorithms.33 Data collection,
29. Ben Chapman-Schmidt, ‘Sex Trafficking’ as Epistemic Violence, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV., April
2019, at 172, 176–79; Musto, Thakor & Gerasimov, supra note 16; J Musto et al., FOSTA-SESTA,
Networked Neo-Abolition, and Sexual Humanitarian Scope Creep, Presentation Paper, Law and Society
Association, Washington D.C., June 2019 (on file with author).
30. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 70.
31. See generally id.
32. Id. at 141–42.
33. MAYANK KEJRIWAL ET AL., FLAGIT: A SYSTEM FOR MINIMALLY SUPERVISED HUMAN
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aggregation, and sorting practices can, in turn, construct
representations about exploitation with predictive potential, including
predicting where future exploitation may occur.34 This gives rise to an
array of surveillance prevention efforts, activities that indeterminately
monitor persons assumed to be at risk but whose identities remain
unknown to authorities alongside efforts to monitor people identified
as “trafficked,” irrespective of whether they themselves identify as
such. Heightened monitoring is justified on the grounds of curtailing
exploitation in the first place (prevention) and limiting future harm
(protection).35 Fulfilling twin prevention and protection aims means
that government actors form partnerships with nongovernmental tech
innovators and academic researchers and utilize automated tools in
their countertrafficking efforts. This raises pressing questions about
the effects of a nascent data-driven, carcerally-oriented collaborative
model of governance in development, one that crowdsources the
protection and prevention of vulnerable populations from different
state and nonstate actors. In the sections that follow, I draw on
questions featured earlier to elaborate on my argument.36 In exploring
each question, I share some findings from my own and others’ research
findings and highlight questions and challenges that surround
data-driven, antitrafficking efforts.
The following is a provisional list of some of the most common
assumptions I have encountered in the context of my research and the
practical effects resulting from each one:

TRAFFICKING INDICATOR MINING 1 (2017); ABBY STYLIANOU ET AL., HOTELS-50K: A GLOBAL HOTEL
RECOGNITION
DATASET
3
(2019),
https://www2.seas.gwu.edu/~pless/papers/Hotels50k.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82AP-K6NJ]; Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 473.
34. Henne & Troshynski, supra note 15, at 64.
35. See, e.g., MUSTO, supra note 8, at 53, 64–65.
36. See infra pp. 1157–72.
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a. Assumption: Traffickers use technology to facilitate
sex trafficking and evade law enforcement
detection.37
•

Implication: Law enforcement can leverage
technology to gather data, investigate suspected
traffickers’ activities, and identify persons at risk
of trafficking.

b. Assumption: Law enforcement lack sufficient
resources and technical capacity to respond to
challenges posed by technology.38
•

Implication: Law enforcement efforts must be
enhanced through the assistance of nonstate
actors and by integrating automated technologies
and artificial intelligence into countertrafficking
efforts.

c. Assumption: Antitrafficking
uniformly helpful.39
•

interventions

are

Implication: By supplementing state efforts with
technology and collaborative partnerships,
people in trafficking situations or those seen as at
risk of trafficking will be better assisted.

My aim in listing these assumptions is not to categorically deny their
validity. Indeed, they often reflect commonsense notions behind
antitrafficking initiatives and are grounded in the daily, practical needs
of some antitrafficking actors. For instance, law enforcement agencies
37. See, e.g., Hannah Devlin, Trafficking Industry Hit as ‘Sex Worker’ Chatbots Fool Thousands,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/13/sex-workerchatbots-fool-thousands-to-hit-trafficking-industry [https://perma.cc/X7WJ-PTT6].
38. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 18, at 8.
39. See id. at 1.
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are tasked with enforcing antitrafficking laws.40 It is therefore sensible
that law enforcement agents are interested in learning about how
suspected traffickers use technology and that some see clear benefits
of having more technical tools at their disposal to pursue
investigations.41 Likewise, if law enforcement agencies lack sufficient
training and resources to investigate trafficking situations facilitated
by technology or to gather information on suspected traffickers’ digital
footprints—as some in law enforcement argue—it is logical that many
also believe that creating partnerships with nonstate actors and using
innovative tools can be supportive of their work.42 Yet taken together,
what this list of assumptions and implications reveals is the kinds of
activities and the particular actors who have come to play a powerful,
if not the most powerful, role in antitrafficking technology initiatives:
law enforcement and nonstate actors interested in assisting law
enforcement through technical innovation.
It is important to stress that competing agendas and divergent
approaches to countertrafficking efforts are not new. However,
growing attention to technology has enhanced the influence of
powerful stakeholders, like law enforcement actors, as well as nonstate
partners, with technical expertise.43 The rise of public–private
partnerships, together with the entrenchment of the dominant criminal
justice-oriented, prosecution-focused approach to addressing
trafficking is significant because it expands crime control approaches
through technology.44
II. Leveraging Technology, Gathering Data
Data is valuable to antitrafficking work. In the context of different
research projects, I interviewed several nongovernmental advocates
40. Id.
41. Inter-Agency Coordination Grp. Against Trafficking in Persons, Human Trafficking and
3–4
(July
2019),
Technology:
Trends,
Challenges
and
Opportunities,
at
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/report/human-trafficking-andtechnology-trends-challenges-and-opportunities/Human-trafficking-and-technology-trends-challengesand-opportunities-WEB...-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6JX-4R3N] [hereinafter ICAT].
42. Id. at 4.
43. Haverkamp, supra note 11, at 68; Thakor & boyd, supra note 12, at 288.
44. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 36.
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and law enforcement agents who argue that technology, and more
specifically data, is crucial in building cases. Other scholars find that
law enforcement view digital evidence as important to their
investigative work.45 For example, if the internet allows suspected
traffickers to advertise victims and “connect more easily with a large
market of users[,]” then “leveraging technology” provides the tools
and techniques to collect and analyze data about suspected traffickers’
activities.46 Examples of valuable data include mobile phone calls, text
messages, financial transactions, GPS patterns, automatic license plate
readers, geolocation data, etc.47 A police officer I interviewed for my
book saw data as an “evidentiary goldmine,” describing it as an
invaluable asset to investigators. Another officer suggested that
gathering suspected traffickers’ digital traces offers a “treasure trove
of material” that can make cases for investigators.48 Law enforcement
also see data as critical in corroborating relationships between
traffickers and the people they are alleged to exploit.49 For some law
enforcement, data is beneficial on the grounds of victim protection;
digital evidence takes pressure off of victims to testify against people
accused of trafficking them.50 An alternate public defender I
interviewed in 2017 lamented this trend, noting that though letting
digital evidence like text messages stand in for victims is beneficial for
prosecutors, it invariably complicates his work and the work of defense
attorneys. As he explains:
I think what is a more interesting issue that should be
publicized is what we’re seeing more of now is DAs are
proceeding to trial without the victims, and allowing the
liberal interpretation of the penal code and the evidence code
to allow all the text messages to come in, and not even have
anyone on the stand . . . It is definitely being utilized
45. SYLVIA WALBY ET AL., STUDY ON THE GENDER DIMENSION OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
165 (2016).
46. ICAT, supra note 41, at 2.
47. See LATONERO ET AL., supra note 17, at iv–v.
48. Id. at 29; MUSTO, supra note 8, at 49–50.
49. LATONERO ET AL., supra note 17, at 29.
50. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 66; Musto, supra note 1, at 131–32.
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more . . . Yes, from a prosecution standpoint, it works
lovely, because [there is] no one to question. The police
officer is just a conduit for the information.51
Moreover, as enthusiasm about the integration of data-driven
antitrafficking efforts grows, another assumption has emerged too,
chiefly, that law enforcement agencies do not have sufficient resources
or the technical capacity to respond to challenges posed by
technology.52 Enter nonstate actors and tech innovators.
III. Creating Partnerships and Building New Tools
The widely held assumption that police and law enforcement
agencies do not have sufficient resources, capacity, or training to
rigorously pursue human trafficking investigations opened the door to
researchers, tech innovators and moral entrepreneurs eager to
supplement law enforcement work in this area. For example, a
nongovernmental advocate I interviewed noted the value of data from
escort and online classified ad sites, explaining “[t]hey provide a lot of
data, and can that data help us address this issue? This is a role
for . . . machine learning.”53 Data scraped from sites are used to train
machine learning algorithms and may be used to assist law
enforcement in identifying trafficked persons.54 A growing number of
antitrafficking stakeholders agree that data scraped from open and dark
web sources can be analyzed to assist law enforcement.55 A new field
of research has developed that aims to use artificial intelligence (AI)
to respond to human trafficking. This work includes machine learning,
computer vision, and natural processing.56 AI countertrafficking
initiatives require data—and massive amounts of it. For researchers
seeking to develop innovative tools, online advertisement sites are also
51. Skype Interview with a Public Defender, in Cal. (Oct. 19, 2017) (on file with author). The public
defender’s name is withheld for confidentiality and ethics reasons.
52. Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 468.
53. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 75.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 69.
56. STYLIANOU ET AL., supra note 33.
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rich sources of data.57 For instance, the Department of Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency’s Memex program supports
“research into domain-specific search,” and “has collected hundreds of
millions of online sex advertisements, a significant (but unknown)
number of which are believed to be sex (and human) trafficking.”58
Research initiatives like those advanced by Memex are premised on
the idea that law enforcement efforts are strengthened by integrating
innovative technical tools with investigators’ toolkits.59 Cooperation
between state and nonstate actors is also framed by authorities as
crucial in helping law enforcement pursue investigations more
efficiently and effectively.60 Nonstate actors, some of whom have
developed tools to scrape and sort data, aid this work—even if
indirectly. And in some jurisdictions, law enforcement personnel have
begun to integrate software developed by nonstate actors into their
investigative work.
Memex software, for example, is used by the Manhattan District
Attorney’s Office in their Human Trafficking Response Unit. 61 In
researching antitrafficking efforts in California, I learned of a human
trafficking unit where detectives were using software developed by
nonstate actors. An officer I interviewed from the unit saw the
integration of software as unambiguously helpful, and a way for
officers to focus on building cases.62 Yet, what is often missing from
discussions about these protocol shifts are the legal questions that arise
as law enforcement come to more heavily rely on automated tools.
The absence of context in antitrafficking matters is another issue.63
Having contextual insight may mean that investigators and the
57. Id.
58. KEJRIWAL ET AL., supra note 33.
59. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 75.
60. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 29
(2014).
61. Kylie Foy, Artificial Intelligence Is Helping Investigators Fight Crime on the Dark Web, LINCOLN
LABORATORY MASS. INST. TECH. (May 7, 2019), https://www.ll.mit.edu/news/artificial-intelligencehelping-investigators-fight-crime-dark-web [https://perma.cc/AP86-HP3B].
62. Interview with a Law Enforcement Agent on a Human Trafficking Task Force, in Cal. (Sept. 21,
2018) (on file with author). The agent’s name is withheld for confidentiality and ethics reasons.
63. CHRISTINA BAIN ET AL., HOW TO RESPONSIBLY CREATE TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS TO
ADDRESS
THE
DOMESTIC
SEX
TRAFFICKING
OF
MINORS
4
(2013),
http://www.danah.org/papers/TechnologistsCSEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDT7-GGSG]; MUSTO, supra
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technologists they partner with understand the differences between
voluntary sex work and sex trafficking. For instance, an ad scraped
from an open or deep web source is not, on its face, a clear indicator
of sex trafficking. Some researchers and antitrafficking actors in the
United States recognize this. However, as research on these trends
suggests, the value afforded to “millions of online sex advertisements”
remains, and the indicators created from it hinge on its size, scalability,
and presumed ability to identify patterns, connect dots, draw
inferences, and make visible phenomena that would otherwise be
hidden.64 Yet context is lost when trafficking is treated solely as a
technical problem and its complex features are reduced to signals and
indicators.
Moreover, automated technologies are also framed as efficient,
objective, and thus uniquely equipped to aid law enforcement in their
efforts. However, a lot is still unknown about the precise ways in
which technologists design these tools and about the ideological
assumptions on which their functionality rests. Some of this has to do
with the fact that tools developed to support countertrafficking
technology efforts are proprietary, their features and technical design
are opaque, and the methods used to define their parameters are a black
box. And like other technologies of measurement and classification,
data-driven tools are not neutral; rather, they function to “legitim[ize]
certain forms of knowledge and experience, while rendering others
invisible.”65 Anthropologist Sally Merry’s insightful observations
about the rise of indicators in the human rights field is instructive in
complicating the idea that indicators are objective.66 Though indicators
may be viewed by some antitrafficking actors as reflecting “objective”
reality and truth, they are imbued with ideological assumptions and
“embedded [within] theories and values that shape apparently
objective information and influence decisions.”67 In essence,

note 8, at 81.
64. KEJRIWAL ET AL., supra note 33.
65. Karen E.C. Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 687 (2015).
66. Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT NO. 3) S83, S84 (2011).
67. Id. at S84–85.
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indicators make knowledge claims about social and political
phenomena and such claims underwrite a “technology of
governance.”68
In applying this idea to antitrafficking efforts augmented by
technology, what emerges is a governance strategy that relies on
amassing data and enhancing law enforcement efforts.69 This strategy
produces notions of risk that in turn authorizes technologies of control
(for instance, enhanced surveillance of all forms of commercial sex)
that unsettle neat distinctions between prevention and protection and
state and nonstate authority.70 Paying attention to the ideologies that
undergird antitrafficking efforts and mapping which bodies and whose
experiences are rendered invisible is crucial, both in terms of assessing
if these efforts are actually effective and whether they contribute to
harms.
IV. Collateral Consequences of Networked Neo-Abolition
Another assumption that circulates among antitrafficking
stakeholders in the United States is that law enforcement focused,
nonstate assisted interventions are uniformly helpful. In the
technology space, a corollary assumption is that by supplementing law
enforcement efforts with collaborative partnerships and technologies,
people in trafficking situations as well as people at risk of trafficking
will get help and assistance as a direct result of the technology. Yet
this is not the case in the United States.71 Absent from public and
stakeholder discussions are the ways in which seemingly protective
antitrafficking policies, now supplemented with innovative tools,
contribute to the arrest and criminalization of both victims of sex
trafficking and voluntary sex workers, which can further contribute to
an uptick in prostitution arrests in jurisdictions where these innovative
approaches have been introduced.72 Though troubling, this is not
68. Id. at S85, S89.
69. Musto & boyd, supra note 8, at 469–70.
70. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 66; WALBY ET AL., supra note 45, at 167.
71. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 81.
72. ALEXANDRA LUTNICK, DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING 30 (2016); MUSTO, supra note 8, at
54; Foy, supra note 61.
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completely surprising. Adults and youth viewed by authorities as
victims of sex trafficking have long endured arrest and detention and
been treated like “victim–offenders.”73 Moreover, because the
criminal justice approach to countertrafficking in the United States is
often based on the conflation of voluntary sex work with sex
trafficking, there are punitive consequences for both sex trafficking
victims and adult voluntary sex workers.74 Sex workers in the United
States and globally have actively highlighted the health risks and
human rights violations that accompany antiprostitution efforts framed
as antitrafficking initiatives.75
While this topic warrants a more in-depth discussion than space
permits, a key point I want to make is that because antitrafficking
initiatives conflate sex work with sex trafficking and because these
same efforts prioritize criminal justice interventions, when augmented
by technology and retooled by collaborative partnerships, this
approach can create vulnerabilities for victims of sex trafficking and
voluntary sex workers. Consider a few examples. Law enforcement
have long posted fake ads and used various decoy strategies to identify
(and sometimes arrest) people selling sex online.76 More recently,
efforts to prevent sexual exploitation online have utilized automated
tools with a focus on exploiters (i.e., what is oft referred to in
antitrafficking circles as targeting the “demand side” of the sex
trade).77 For instance, as part of an AI-augmented end demand
campaign,
the
New
York
Police
Department
used
“women”—presenting bots in human drag to target unsuspecting sex
buyers.78 Some nonprofit agents masquerading as antitrafficking moral
entrepreneurs have likewise pursued similar strategies, for instance by
posting fake ads on sites where sexual services are known to be

73. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 29; Haverkamp, supra note 11, at 64.
74. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 54.
75. Hoefinger et al., supra note 11, at 23.
76. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 57–58.
77. Id. at 138.
78. Tina Rosenberg, A.I. Joins the Campaign Against Sex Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/opinion/ai-joins-the-campaign-against-sex-trafficking.html
[https://perma.cc/7223-D33P]. Though deterrence, not arrest appeared to be the goal of the campaign, it
is unclear if data about people approached by the NYPD was kept or used for other purposes. Id.
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advertised.79 The nonprofit agency Seattle Against Slavery is behind
one recent disruptive AI-enhanced effort to deter sex buyers and uses
chatbot sex worker decoys.80 Robert Beiser, the organization’s
Executive Director, conceded, “not everyone selling sex online was a
trafficking victim.”81 Nonetheless, he argues that the strategy his
organization uses was developed based on the experiences of some
trafficking survivors who had “reported . . . transactions [related to
their trafficking situations] were typically initiated online.”82
Prevention efforts that focus on ending male demand for
commercial sex may appear to signal a move away from policy and
enforcement strategies that myopically target sellers (i.e., people,
though particularly women engaged in commercial sex either by
choice or force).83 Yet, efforts to prevent trafficking do not focus solely
on prospective exploiters; similarly, intensified efforts to pursue
criminal prosecutions as a strategy of deterrence do not only implicate
people alleged to have facilitated trafficking. Rather, in an
antitrafficking environment that prioritizes criminalization strategies,
people assumed to be at risk of trafficking can also experience arrest,
detention, and mandated court participation.84 Others may experience
law enforcement surveillance and different types of monitoring,
screening, and filtering. For instance, some may have their images and
content scraped and their digital footprints amassed in datasets to
develop algorithms designed to investigate places where trafficking
occurs (hotels for example).85 Still others may have their content
risk-assessed. Nick Shapiro of Airbnb and Bradley Myles of Polaris,
an antitrafficking organization, described their joint efforts as taking a
“modern approach” to antislavery efforts, which hinges on developing
enhanced screening, scoring, and risk-assessment methods to “mine
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Devlin, supra note 37.
82. Id.
83. Samantha A. Majic, Real Men Set Norms? Anti-Trafficking Campaigns and the Limits of Celebrity
Norm Entrepreneurship, 14 CRIME MEDIA CULTURE 289, 296–97 (2017).
84. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 29; Hoefinger et al., supra note 11, at 6; Majic, supra note 83.
85. STYLIANOU ET AL., supra note 33; Sean Captain, This AI Can Spot Signs of Human Trafficking in
Online Sex Ads, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90424645/how-imagerecognition-ai-is-busting-sex-traffickers [https://perma.cc/3R7N-NGAS].
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for signs of human trafficking in real time.”86 Yet it appears that efforts
to prevent sexual exploitation online and identify prospective victims
are not without consequence, evidenced by sex worker reports about
restricted access to seemingly pedestrian activities (for example,
making an Airbnb reservation).87 Not only do these examples aim to
highlight the fact that data-driven antitrafficking efforts do not solely
target prospective exploiters or leverage cooperative partnerships and
automation to identify a trafficking survivor “in real time.” They
produce notions of risk and “ways of seeing and knowing . . . that
minimize individual complexity.”88 The sociotechnical production of
at-risk victims in tech-oriented antitrafficking efforts are shaped by
quantification and experts’ selective filtering of the exploitative
experiences of some to broadly authorize the surveillance of many.
Notions of risk further authorize technologies of control, for instance,
enhanced surveillance techniques, that unsettle neat distinctions
between prevention and protection and state and nonstate authority.89
In describing how ideas about youth at risk turn complex situations
and nuanced life experiences into equations, calculations, and
algorithms, the sociologist Max Greenberg deftly explains how past
experiences of violence and trauma shape predictions of the future:
[E]xperiences become prophecies that can be applied to a

different set of people . . . . [S]trangers’ experiences with
violence and trauma can cause someone whom they have
never met to be labeled as at risk. Crime data is used to mark
noncriminals as at risk and injury data is used to mark
healthy people as at risk. The meanings jump between arenas

86. Bradley Myles & Nick Shapiro, Taking a Modern Approach to Combatting Modern Slavery,
MEDIUM (Feb. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@AirbnbCitizen/taking-a-modern-approach-tocombating-modern-slavery-227db96d732b [https://perma.cc/M9Y8-EWB4].
87. EJ Dickson, Who’s Allowed to Use Airbnb?, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 9, 2020, 10:37 AM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/airbnb-sex-worker-discrimination-935048/
[https://perma.cc/HTS5-WPEA].
88. Henne & Troshynski, supra note 15, at 17.
89. MUSTO, supra note 8, at 71; WALBY ET AL., supra note 45, at 167.
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and individuals. Risk data are, in a sense, a map of the past
that is used to predict the future.90
Data about at-risk trafficked persons in a neo-abolitionist, networked
landscape similarly lumps and jumps; it lumps a wide range of
people’s experiences who trade sex into the categorical confines of a
victim “at risk.” Ideas about risk and attendant cooperative efforts that
utilize automated tools also jump between different kinds of sexual
arrangements, flattening the diverse ways people arrange and facilitate
sexual labor, while also foreclosing more nuanced discussions about
ways people experience exploitation or develop different (noncarceral)
strategies to address it. Past harm endured by some (e.g., survivors of
trafficking who identify as such and whose exploitation was facilitated
by technology) is selectively culled to predict future harms for many.
Still, the accuracy of this prediction at scale is unknown.
Heightened monitoring by nonstate actors and automated tools may
aim to identify (and protect) prospective victims and deter or prevent
exploitation altogether. Yet here again, this erases the experiences of
a vast array of voluntary sex workers who do not identify as survivors
of trafficking. It also subjects them to state and nonstate surveillance
efforts that constrain their ability to mitigate the harms of a criminal
legal system that still widely criminalizes sexual labor and their ability
to function productively in society by earning an income, securing
housing, and engaging in harm reduction strategies. And notably, in a
networked neo-abolitionist landscape, harms are not limited to the
criminal legal system nor exclusively perpetuated by state actors
tasked with enforcing antitrafficking and prostitution laws (e.g., police
officers).91 Sex workers and even self-identified trafficked persons
face vulnerabilities from nonstate actors too—the “powerful
adjacent”—including third-party intermediaries whose work supports
and sometimes expands carceral agendas.92 Harms may also result
90. MAX A. GREENBERG, 12 WEEKS TO CHANGE A LIFE: AT-RISK YOUTH IN A FRACTURED STATE
52–53 (2019) (emphasis added).
91. Chapman-Schmidt, supra note 29, at 184–85.
92. Jennifer Musto, Transing Critical Criminology: A Critical Unsettling and Transformative
Anti-Carceral Feminist Reframing, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 37, 49 (2019).
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from automated systems in ways that have yet to be fully accounted
for.
For several years I have sought to identify and document harms
resulting from data-driven efforts. This is challenging because what I
call harms are seldom recognized or counted by officials. The harms
people in sex trafficking situations may experience include having
their mobile phones searched as well as contending with heightened
online and offline monitoring by law enforcement and their nonstate
partners.93 One person I interviewed for my book, Kiara, self-identifies
as a victim of sex trafficking. Though she eventually received help
from law enforcement, prior to that, she was arrested multiple times,
put on probation, and required to complete a mandatory prostitution
diversion program. In addition to all of that, she continues to endure
other harms too. For example, every time she applies for a job, tries to
get an apartment, or is required to submit to a background check, the
data trail left from her history of arrests serves as a reminder that
negotiating life after trafficking means dealing with a digital record
about her past that limits her current and future choices.94 Sex workers,
trafficked persons, and people labeled as at risk of sexual exploitation
must contend with laws that still widely criminalize sex work while
also navigating human-orchestrated, tech-augmented antitrafficking
activities that police and algorithmically constrain their activities and
behavior.95 Some of these tools rely on crowdsourced data and seem
to rely on technical experts (but not necessarily human trafficking
domain experts) who appear to unquestionably expect that their efforts
will be welcomed and uniformly helpful.96 Too little empirical
research exists to know for sure. But what is clear is that these activities
raise questions about privacy, safety, and how to meaningfully protect
trafficked persons not only from exploitative traffickers but also from
the harms of tech-oriented antitrafficking interventions. And because
vulnerabilities do not directly emanate from the criminal legal system,
more typical criminal justice remedies (for instance, expunging a
93.
94.
95.
96.
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criminal conviction) are insufficient, raising questions about how to
document and meaningfully ameliorate such vulnerabilities.
Another trend I have been following is the application of big data
and the integration of facial recognition technologies in antitrafficking
and border-enforcement activities.97 While there are clearly benefits to
law enforcement, these technologies may also carry risks for those
subjected to it, not only because the technology relies on people’s
images to create data sets but also because this work commonly occurs
without people’s knowledge or consent.98 In a 2016 paper titled, The
Role of Technology in the Fight Against Human Trafficking,
researchers note that “technology has facilitated the recording, storage
and exchange of victims’ information . . . .”99 Paradoxically, the tools
aimed at protecting victims may also subject them to invasive forms
of surveillance, a trend that has the capacity to “undermine the
fundamental rights of both the victims and other individuals who may
be collaterally affected.”100 In addition to privacy risks, another
concern centers on the ways in which automated technologies create
what scholar Ruha Benjamin describes as a “digital caste system” that
entrenches inequalities and increases discrimination.101 Taken
together, these trends matter not only because of the effect on people
who have experienced or who are vulnerable to trafficking but also
because these tools cast a wide net and can adversely impact migrants
and sex workers who do not self-identify as trafficked but are directly
affected by countertrafficking efforts nonetheless.

97. McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks Its Targets in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation.html?auth=linked-google
&smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/PM9X-GM8M].
98. Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech Is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, N.Y. TIMES (July
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-faces-facial-recognitiontechnology.html [https://perma.cc/HU9W-A4C9].
99. Felicity Gerry QC et al., The Role of Technology in the Fight Against Human Trafficking:
Reflections on Privacy and Data Protection Concerns, 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 205, 206
(2016).
100. Id.
101. RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE
13–14 (2019).
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V. Lessons and Future Directions
Efforts to transform technology from a “liability into an asset”
undoubtedly open up new opportunities for law enforcement and
technology innovators.102 However, the collaborative partnerships and
tools used to support countertrafficking efforts also create risks,
including but not limited to privacy risks for people vulnerable to
trafficking.103 Not only is it rare in the United States for these risks to
be publicly discussed, we also do not currently have a meaningful way
to assist people if and when these tools get it wrong.104 For instance,
how does a person flagged by an automated system as at risk of
trafficking go about removing data about them from a database they
may not even know exists? Data about actual people involved in
vulnerable and possibly exploitative labor situations is the source
material on which entire data sets are based; yet, who owns and
controls the data? Do people vulnerable to trafficking get a say in how
data about them is used? For instance, can they contest if they are
categorized as a victim or a criminal offender? Do trafficked persons
or people adversely impacted by countertrafficking efforts have the
right to be forgotten?105 In the absence of a U.S. policy equivalent to
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
current U.S. antitrafficking laws might not be sufficiently equipped to
remedy reputational harms and risks that may accompany data-driven
interventions.106 Asking these questions and interrogating the
assumptions behind the development and use of new technologies are
important first steps in uncovering the limitations of the current
countertrafficking landscape and in thinking about how to learn from
the past to effectuate change in the future. The following ideas offer a
tentative framework that could serve as a working platform to guide
future innovation.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Published by Reading Room,

Using Technology to Combat Trafficking, supra note 20.
Id.
MUSTO, supra note 8, at 132–33.
Id.
Id.

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [], Art. 11

1170

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:4

A. Come for the Tech, Stay for the Data
This first idea, “come for the tech, stay for the data,” riffs on a
message I heard from sex worker activists in the late 2000s advising
members of the public drawn to the topic of sex trafficking to “come
for the sex, stay for the labor.” In my reading of it, this message aims
to move public attention away from sensationalized depictions of sex
trafficking and towards an understanding of the structural factors and
inequalities that contribute to exploitation across different labor
sectors. Inspired by sex worker rights activist insights, and the work of
scholars and advocates tracking the detrimental impacts of mass
surveillance and automated decision-making in all facets of social and
political life, the slogan I want to propose is “come for the tech, stay
for the data.” Staying for the data means understanding the immense
value of data in countertrafficking projects while at the same time
acknowledging that the benefits of this data are not equally shared or
evenly distributed. Staying for the data also means that as more
trafficking survivors, migrants and sex workers encounter
tech-mediated antitechnology efforts and the different (human) actors
and automated systems behind it, stakeholders must not only be
attuned and responsive to risks that come with these efforts but
proactive in preventing them in the first place.
B. Apply Sunshine to “Shadow” Data Sets and Practices
The premise behind applying light to “shadow” data sets and those
otherwise hidden from public view connects to the first point but
extends it further by calling for the advancement of victim-centered
data-protection principles. To apply sunshine to proprietary systems
and data means thinking about the processes by which antitrafficking
actors, including but not limited to law enforcement, decide to (or
decide not to) collect, analyze and make use of data about victims.
Applying sunshine also entails asking questions about data-driven
antitrafficking efforts and evaluating who benefits and who is harmed
when nuanced experiences of vulnerability and exploitation are
transformed into decontextualized indicators and data points, and then
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used to authorize all sorts of activities with all kinds of very real
consequences. To apply sunshine means centering the experiences of
end users (i.e., people viewed by tech experts as vulnerable to
trafficking), who currently have little control or say over how their data
is used. Finally, to apply sunshine to data practices invites us to think
more broadly about transparency and the data protection strategies
most suitable to protecting all people—especially individuals and
groups vulnerable to labor exploitation as well as heightened state,
corporate and humanitarian surveillance. The GDPR guidelines to
support transparency, data protection, and privacy offers one example
and seems like an interesting framework to consider and possibly build
upon in future efforts.107
C. Do No Harm: Ethics and Accountability in Antitrafficking
Technology Work
In addition to considering the policies and regulatory strategies that
support transparency and data protection, a final idea, “do no harm,”
is inspired by my conversations with colleagues from the Vienna
Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation and LEFÖ as part
of a workshop we organized in Vienna, Austria, in October 2019,
focused on ethics and accountability in antitrafficking work as well as
earlier work centered on a trauma-informed model of care for
survivors of human trafficking.108 To do no harm is premised on an
uncomfortable but plain truth: antitrafficking activities can cause
harm. The cost of data-driven antitrafficking efforts are not necessarily
monetary but rather can be calculated in terms of inequities that result
from state-orchestrated initiatives augmented by nonstate actors that
perpetuate or even exacerbate extant structural vulnerabilities. To do
no harm may mean that community initiatives, with or without
107. See Complete Guide to GDPR Compliance, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu [https://perma.cc/EP4YLD3U] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
108. Annie Fehrenbacher, First, Do No Harm: Designing a Model of Trauma-Informed Care for
Survivors of Human Trafficking in Los Angeles County, CSW UPDATE (UCLA Ctr. for the Study of
Women, L.A., Cal.), Jan. 2013, at 16, 16–24, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8m39h3jq
[https://perma.cc/M2SG-6YR7].
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technology, are prioritized over law enforcement approaches (i.e.,
anticarceral, community-based approaches instead of law enforcement
approaches) and that people in trafficking and exploitative labor
situations have more control over how data about them is used and in
what context.
An examination of technology in the countertrafficking space
reveals recurring tensions between law enforcement and rights-based
approaches. It also illuminates assumptions, such as the one that posits
more law enforcement-focused, nonstate-actor-supported data-driven
efforts are necessary to securing justice for people in trafficking
situations. However, a closer look at how technology is used and by
whom also invites us to ask different questions and to leverage the
power of our all-too-human creative potential in thinking about how
to value and prioritize data ethics, transparency, and accountability in
future countertrafficking work.
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